Population Council

Knowledge Commons

2-1-2021

A Covid Agenda from the Perspective of Adolescent Girls and
Young Women
Judith Bruce
Population Council

Follow this and additional works at: https://knowledgecommons.popcouncil.org/series_pdr_essays-covid

How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know!
Recommended Citation
Bruce, Judith. “A Covid Agenda from the Perspective of Adolescent Girls and Young Women.” In Covid-19
and the Global Demographic Research Agenda, edited by Landis MacKellar and Rachel Friedman, 23–27.
New York: Population Council, 2021.

This Commentary is brought to you for free and open access by the Population Council.

A Covid Agenda from the
Perspective of Adolescent
Girls and Young Women
Judith Bruce

If I had been asked to write this commentary a year ago (December 2019),
I would have offered the same top-line messages about the demographic
agenda, focusing on a core constituency for that agenda—adolescent girls
and young women in the poorest countries and communities. Applying December 2020 hindsight—no pun intended—these areas of inquiry hold, even
though they are selectively amplified and reshaped by Covid. To understand
what is unfolding before our eyes requires an unsparing inquiry from a postCovid perspective. We must track not only traditional impacts, but ask what
strategies and programs/projects mitigated negative impacts and promoted
positive ones. The needed research can be very roughly sorted into individual,
household, and community levels, with considerable overlaps and linkages
among the three. Priority for the research investment should be accorded to
the populations most excluded and at risk pre-Covid.
The first impact of the pandemic worthy of study is its effect on the female dependency burden—not the conventional age-structure dependency
burden, but the already disproportionate share of food and water provisioning, schooling, and physical-care responsibilities falling on females. Is the
pandemic intensifying and redefining the burden? And on which females? A
high and rising proportion of females can expect to be sole or majority providers for themselves, their children and grandchildren, and their parents and
grandparents. Even when males are present and contributing, female income
to a far greater extent than male income is “family income.” If current patterns hold post-Covid, resources and income under female control will have
many times the family impact of comparable income under male control
and, therefore, increasing females’ economic inclusion should be prioritized.
Girls’ exercise of sexual and reproductive rights requires more than
information and service access. They, like male peers, must have viable
economic choices and an identity independent of sexuality, marriage, and
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childbearing. Key to this is preparation for decent livelihoods, which can be
measured by proxies such as completed schooling, mastery of basic financial and digital skills, incubator savings, and the social networks on which
livelihoods often depend. Girls’ acquisition of such assets promotes deferred
marriage and planned fertility; reduces the risk of STIs, including HIV/AIDS;
and increases intergenerational investment in children’s health and education. How will the dislocations of the pandemic—not only school disruption,
but also girls’ visible economic response in this emergency—affect girls’ selfidentification as economic actors in their life-course and reproductive aspirations? And, just as vitally, will there be a public appreciation of their burden
and promise, which translates into increased investment in their economic
inclusion? In the poorest communities pre-Covid, girls’ completion of secondary school was already at risk. During Covid, an all-girls school drawing
students from a deprived rural Tanzanian district reported that the majority
of the 300 girls returning to school post-confinement had not had the time
nor facilities required to complete their “remote” studies. Most had been
absorbed in survival caring and provisioning at home and some were sent
to work the land (less true of their brothers). A network of school graduate
mentors overseeing “girls’ clubs” in home communities feared that mentees
in the public system, in which post-confinement had extended school by two
hours, would be under pressure to drop out given their role backstopping the
family survival strategy.
The pandemic may further alter the “shape” of girls’ lives, which is
markedly different than that of boys. Girls’ biological puberty is earlier
(approximately age 12) than that of boys; girls’ age of socially constructed
“puberty” is often even younger in some traditional settings and many “modern” ones—owing to sexualizing norms promoted by social media. Girls’
reproductive health, social, and economic trajectories are largely set by age
15. For males, not only is biological puberty later, but its consequences more
favorable—their lives are getting better, their mobility greater, their share
of everything (including power) increased. Girls’ resilience is tested in early
adolescence, and few poor girls have an orderly transition to adulthood as
per the policy nostrum life course—have adequate food, have vaccinations,
enter school, complete school, find employment, select life partner, start a
family, remain securely married. The observance of this script is a privilege
for both males and females, but far rarer for deprived females. A longitudinal
dataset from Malawi revealed that females were ten times more likely than
male peers to undergo a major “transition”—leaving school, sexual initiation,
marriage, becoming a parent, moving household, etc., between the ages of
16 and 19. We need to study the impacts of the pandemic on events—leaving school, labor and sexual exploitation, household displacement, etc., that
have the potential to move girls off-track permanently. And, from a response
point of view, what types of programs—and timing beginning at what age—
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can prevent the worst outcomes and offer second chances to those who have
already fallen behind?
Females’ sexual, marriage, and labor markets are already harmfully
intertwined and possibly further complicated by Covid conditions. Females’
sexual exposure rises in crisis, when sex may be included in the price of survival goods. Displacement/confinement-driven “marriages” increase the risk
of unsafe pregnancy, and for many young mothers solo lifetime responsibility
for children. Such marriages, even when they provide a temporary sense of
protection, may simply defer risk to the young bride. They can be both unstable and unsafe, owing to a lack of meaningful consent, the haste of their
conclusion, and mobility pressures on one or both partners to secure work
and food. Campaigns to end child marriage in South Asia and sub-Saharan
Africa report setbacks under Covid as destitute parents see marrying off a
young daughter as an emergency poverty-alleviation response. Research
questions include how the countervailing pressures on families to preserve
adolescent females’ marriageability and family reputation, while also having
an urgent need for survival income, are (were) resolved under Covid. What
are (were) the results for girls’ marriage timing, partner selection, pressure
for children, and marital stability?
The lives of the girls and young women central to this commentary are
strongly conditioned by household demands. Household size and composition and how the “family” is socially constructed and its rules for allocating
labor and food resources are vital information for demographic assessments
and the design of relief and recovery efforts. Local meanings of household
“headship” must be closely interrogated, lest this role be mechanically assigned to the oldest male, even if he is seldom home and it is the females who
are bringing in most resources. When households are entitled to support,
whether in kind or cash or access to services, how is it optimally delivered
into complex households? Distribution of food during the rehabilitation phase
of the Biafran crisis was encumbered by insufficient understanding of who
was responsible for feeding whom. Malnourished children were not always
the responsibility of their biological mothers, but of the female partners of
their fathers. Households readily adapt when stressed by external shocks. In
many deprived settings, new shocks—such as Covid—compound and extend
old ones. In the Sahel, afflicted by long-term environmental degradation,
drought, and endemic conflict, large nominally male-headed compounds
are often composed of multiple female-centered families with each female in
charge of provisioning her “cooking pot” dependents.
Household power relations can be disrupted by Covid confinement. Men
spending more time at home, accompanied by reports of escalating domestic
violence, has turned attention to the relations between adult partners—but
there are other power relations to investigate. A field report from Kenya relayed a provisional finding of more shared decision-making over resources
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under Covid. Perhaps, but plausibly, female partners permit power-sharing
to make peace and compensate for lost control by allocating more work to
younger females. An interesting question will be how, under Covid confinement conditions, adolescent girls’ labor, fertility, sexuality, and claim on food
figure into household bargaining between adult partners. To what extent do
females shift the burden of provisioning and caregiving among themselves
rather than challenge the privilege and leisure of older and younger males?
On a brighter note, it will be worth examining how Covid can (from
the strategy and program/project design point of view) or did (from the lessons learned point of view) open up new livelihood opportunities for young
females. Covid has increased likely durable demand for locally available, affordable, nutritious food and potable water; primary health care; safer, more
comfortable multipurpose homes; low-cost renewable energy, and reliable
digital connectivity for work, technical, and in-person learning aids. But, if
these new opportunities materialize, can or will they be seized safely? Increasing home-based work in poor settings accommodates childcare and home
schooling, but generates little income, can reduce female control over earnings, and may raise tensions with partners. Traditional work in community
fields or marketplaces, though not risk-free, is conducted in familiar locations
with some protective mechanisms. Post-Covid, better-paid work in modernizing sectors may entail mobility, new personalities, and places to navigate
and skills to master—but also incur high safety and sexual risks.
Finally, it is important to study Covid at the community level as crises
illuminate and intensify preexisting divisions. Information about community
substructures is vital to craft responses that strengthen social cohesion, channels of communication, and competence in delivering core services. Pre-Covid
conventional community-engagement strategies, including “youth mobilization,” convened forums, curated “dialogues,” and delivered resources in ways
that tended to reinforce male dominance and formal control over community
facilities and grant males preferential access to new technologies. Female
leadership (where it existed) was token, and few avenues were provided for
the expression of the needs of younger females or poorer households with
children.
The learning opportunity—analytic and programmatic—of defining
meaningful access to valued resources for different demographic segments
cannot be overstated. Neither communities nor girls in the same communities are homogeneous. Rapid Covid responses have assumed sufficient—if
not uniform—connectivity to render remote health and schooling support
effective. Yet, in urban Ethiopia, girls in domestic service had negligible (and
not private) phone access. In contrast, in Mozambique, an adolescent girls
initiative with just weeks of experience in a new site had created enough
social capital that neighbors lent phones to girls to receive Covid protection
instructions and coordinate drop-off of food and hygienic supplies and homelearning lesson plans. In places where girls have more cell phone coverage
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they may have enhanced access to protection protocols and remote social
support but are also subject to sexual messaging and trafficking.
The delineation of communities into segments may require refinement
to see pre- and post-Covid “transitions” more clearly. Standard cohort segmentation may not serve; for example, girls 10 to 14 may be more usefully
divided into girls 10 to 12 and 13 to 14 given the demographic significance
of puberty and transition to secondary school. In some settings, classifying
females not simply by their age but also by the age of the children for which
they are responsible might be instructive. Once segmentation has been contextualized, we can explore for each segment what is “their” safe access to
core resources (e.g., food security, water, health care), “their” time use, and
“their” community of information (how and from whom “they” share information, what information is trusted and actionable). There may be segmentspecific mental health impacts of Covid conditions. Psychological traumas
may rob the young of their resilience, even when external factors improve.
Younger females may be especially subject to depression, withdrawal, and a
loss of the confidence needed to resist religious authoritarianism and demeaning gender roles.
That said, and equally worthy of study, there are shining examples in
the context of Covid and other emergencies of young female cadres functioning as frontline “social first responders.” Female mentors and their adolescent mentees have provided rapid responses to food insecurity, shaped and
updated Covid protection messages, met reproductive health needs with
privacy, interceded in medical emergencies and domestic violence, assisted
community-wide at-home learning through virtual platforms, and delivered
in person, when possible, critical goods, even homemade sanitary supplies
and emergency entitlements to the most in-need households. The question
is, can the knowledge the Covid pandemic revealed about intracommunity
inequalities in access and the disruption it brought to traditional community
structures be constructively harnessed? Can this experience bolster the commitment to inclusive communities with accountable plans to reach the most
vulnerable, actively solicit young female participation, establish permanent
female-accessible platforms through which to deliver health information,
mental health, social support, as well as vital commodities including contraception, and increase food security, impart livelihood skills, extend connectivity, and build a wider basis of civic engagement—before the next crisis?
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